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Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc. v. Dist. Court, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 6 (Mar. 4, 2021)1 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PREEMPTION 
 
Summary 
 The Court held that plaintiffs’ strict product liability, breach of implied warranty, and 
deceptive trade practices claims against propofol drug manufacturers were preempted by federal 
law because it would have been impossible for them to comply with federal law and avoid state 
tort liability. The plaintiffs’ negligence claim, however, was not preempted because the 
manufacturers could have avoided state liability without violating of federal law. 
 
Background 
 In 1989, the FDA approved the anesthetic, propofol (also known as Diprivan). The FDA 
granted Petitioners Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., Baxter Healthcare Corporation, and 
McKeeson Medical-Surgical, Inc. permission to manufacture generic propofol and distribute it in 
20mL, 50mL, and 100mL vials. The labels on each vial clearly indicated that they were for 
single-patient use. 
 Petitioners all sold propofol to Dr. Depak Desai for his endoscopy centers in Las Vegas.2  
Contrary to the warning on the labels, Dr. Desai used the 50mL vials for multiple patients. He 
was subsequently criminally charged for these actions. Due to this criminal use of single-patient 
vials on multiple patients, his patients all received letters from the CDC and SNHD warning 
them of a possible risk of infection with Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, and HIV. Plaintiffs in this 
action are a group of approximately 800 of Dr. Desai’s patients who received these letters. All 
plaintiffs had the recommended tests, and all their tests came back negative.  
 In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged claims of strict product liability, breach of implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular use, negligence, violation of Nevada Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act, and punitive damages. Plaintiffs specifically alleged that petitioners knew or 
should have known that selling 50mL vials, not 20mL vials, of propofol to an ambulatory 
surgical center with high patient turnover is unsafe because it entices doctors to use a single vial 
on multiple patients, thereby increasing the risks of contamination. They sought to obtain 
compensation for the testing costs and pain and suffering while awaiting test results.  
 Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that plaintiffs’ claims conflicted with 
federal law, namely the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.3 The 
district court denied the motion, finding plaintiffs’ claims were not preempted by federal law. 




1  By Mia Bacher. 
2  Dr. Desai is now deceased and is not a party in this action. 





Entertaining the petition 
 
 Writs of mandamus can be used to compel performance of an act required by law or to 
control an arbitrary or capricious discretionary action.4 Generally, the Nevada Supreme Court 
will refuse to consider writs on a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, but it will 
exercise its discretion to consider one when “an important issue of law needs clarification and 
considerations of sound judicial economy and administration militate in favor of granting the 
petition.”5 
 Here, the Court decided that whether or not plaintiffs’ claims are preempted under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act is an important issue of law that needs clarification. Given the early stage of 




 Preemption is an issue that the Court reviews de novo, without any deference to the 
district court’s findings.6 The doctrine of preemption comes from the US Constitution’s 
Supremacy Clause, which provides that federal law supersedes state law.7 There are two types of 
preemption: express and implied. Express preemption occurs when Congress specifically 
declares a statute will preempt state law. Implied preemption occurs if federal law dominates a 
particular area of law (field preemption) or conflicts with state law (conflict preemption). 
 Petitioners argued conflict preemption applied here because it is impossible for them to 
comply with the Hatch-Waxman Act and also avoid state tort law. They relied on PLIVA Inc. v 
Mensing8 and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett9 to make their argument. In Mensing, a 
group of plaintiffs sued a drug manufacturer, arguing the drug manufacturer knew or should have 
known that it had a duty under state law to warn of the severe neurological disorder their drug 
could cause with long-term use.10 The Supreme Court held that the state claims were preempted 
because the manufacturer’s duty under state law conflicted with their duty under the Hatch-
Waxman Act.11 This conflict occurred because federal law required generic labels to match those 
of the name brand labels while the state law required there to be additional protections listed on 
generic brands, thus it would be impossible for manufacturers to comply with both laws.12 The 
 
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.160 (2017); Int’l Game Tech. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 
558 (2008). 
5  City of Mesquite v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 135 Nev. 240, 243, 445 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2019). 
6  Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 123 Nev. 362, 370, 168 P.3d 73, 79.  
7  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
8  PLIVA Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011). 
9  Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013). 
10  Mensing, 564 U.S. at 610. 
11  Id. at 618.  
12  Id. 
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Court rejected the argument that manufacturers could have asked the FDA to help strengthen 
warnings to avoid conflict preemption.13 A similar situation occurred in Bartlett, but there the 
Court rejected the argument that the drug manufacturer could have simply stopped selling their 
drug in the state to avoid the preemption.14 
 Read together, these cases hold that the Hatch-Waxman Act imposes a duty of 
“sameness” between generic and name brand drug labels. A state law that imposes a duty on 
generic drug manufacturers to alter their label or design makes it impossible for these 
manufacturers to comply with federal law and avoid state liability. 
 
Analysis of state- and federal-law duty 
 
 Petitioners argued that plaintiffs’ claims are preempted because their cause of action 
would impose a duty on them (the manufacturers) to alter the 50mL vial, change its warning 
labels, or stop selling the drug in Nevada. To determine whether this is the case, the court 
identified the duties under state law and compared those to the duties under federal law.15 
Plaintiffs conceded that their strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims are preempted 
under Mensing and Bartlett, but contended that their negligence and deceptive trade practice 
claims were not preempted because they were not premised on the labeling or design of the drug. 
 Plaintiffs’ deceptive trade practices claim alleged that petitioners made false 
representations and omitted facts about the 50mL vial. However, the only representations 
identified in their complaint were of those contained in the FDA-approved label. Petitioners thus 
could not have changed the alleged misrepresentations without violating federal law. Therefore, 
plaintiffs’ deceptive trade practices claim was preempted. 
 Plaintiffs’ negligence claim alleged that petitioners owed a duty “to distribute, market, 
and packages the propofol in safe single use vials that are not conducive to multi-dosing” and 
that they should have known that distributing 50mL to high-turnover ambulatory clinics would 
encourage such multi-dosing. In short, they argued that petitioners had a duty not to sell to Dr. 
Desai’s ambulatory surgical clinics. Plaintiffs’ negligence claim was preempted to the extent that 
they alleged improper warnings.  
Plaintiffs’ claim that petitioners had a duty not to sell the 50mL vials was not preempted, 
as petitioners have not been able to establish that this would conflict with federal law. Here, 
petitioners argued that to avoid liability they would have either (1) had to stop selling 50mL vials 
to Dr. Desai or (2) alter the size of the vials. The first option is not precluded by Mensing or 
Bartlett because petitioners did not demonstrate that they had a duty under federal law to 
continue selling 50mL vials to clinics they should have known were misusing the product. This 
does not conflict with Bartlett because it would not require manufacturers to stop selling entirely 
in the State of Nevada, it would only require them to stop selling to clinics that they knew were 
 
13  Id. at 620–24. 
14  Bartlett, 570 U.S. at 475–76. 
15  See id. at 480. 
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misusing the drug. In the alternative, the manufacturers could sell just the 20mL vials, which are 
also FDA approved, without having to alter the design of the 50mL vial. Thus, the claim of 
negligence was not preempted. 
 
Conclusion 
 The petition for writ of mandamus was denied as it pertained to the negligence claim but 
was granted as it pertained to the strict product liability, breach of implied warranty, and 
deceptive trade practices claims. 
